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ABSTRACT 
A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and 
was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern 
framework for philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) 
and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and 
relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as 
the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe 
the two systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world 
derives from our innate axiomatic System 1, and how this interacts with System 
2. It was a revolution in epistemology since it showed that our actions rest not on 
judgements but on innate undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate 
the work of Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of 
thought prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of 
intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
  
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting 
whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know, 
after all.” On Certainty p48 
 
 “But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
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nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.” (OC p94). 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-
314 
 "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 (1933) 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” ”-- Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--
yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained 
or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. 
But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification 
and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that 
ALL truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data 
gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular 
context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used 
in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or 
COS) are clear. . The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot 
mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in 
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a very specific context. Thus, W looks at perspicuous examples of the varying uses 
of the words ‘know’ and ‘certain’, often in trialogues with his 3 typical 
perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and commentator, leaving the reader to 
decide the best use (clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only 
describe the uses of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, 
no metaphysical insights. It is truly sad that most philosophers continue to waste 
their time on the linguistic confusions peculiar to philosophy rather than turning 
their attention to those of the other behavioral disciplines and to physics, biology 
and mathematics, where it is desperately needed. 
W wrote this ‘book’ (not really a book but notes he made during the last two years 
of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to work) because he 
realized that G.E. Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of 
all philosophy--how it’s possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and 
not to be able to doubt it. All anyone can do is to examine minutely the working 
of the language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are used to 
describe the primitive automated prelinguistic system one (S1) functions of our 
brain (my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced deliberative linguistic system two (S2) 
functions (my K2, C2 and D2). Of course, W does not use the two systems 
terminology, which only came to the fore in psychology some half century after 
his death, and has yet to penetrate philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two 
systems framework (the ‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, and 
one can see clear foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after half 
a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and 
Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), and The Varieties of Self-
Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014), Andy Hamilton’s 
‘Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’, and above 
all the many recent books and papers of  Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) and Peter 
Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. For an 
excellent quick look at how various philosophers react to OC and how they go 
astray see McDougall’s ‘Critical Notice of Readings of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty’, free on the net like most papers now. DMS and PH have been the 
leading scholars of the later W, each writing or editing half a dozen books (many 
reviewed by me) and many papers in the last decade. However, the difficulties of 
coming to grips with the basics of our higher order psychology, i.e., of how 
language (approximately the same as the mind, as W showed us) works are 
evidenced by Coliva, one of the most brilliant and prolific contemporary 
philosophers, who made remarks in a very recent article which show that after 
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years of intensive work on the later W, she really does not quite get that he has 
solved the most basic problems of the description of human behavior. As DMS 
makes clear, one cannot even coherently state misgivings about the operations of 
our basic psychology (W’s ‘Hinges’ which I equate to S1) without lapsing into 
incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of both of these workers (limitations 
shared by all students of behavior) in her recent articles, which (like those of 
Coliva, Hacker etc. are available free online - philpapers.org, researchgate.net, 
academia,edu, arixiv.org, libgen.io, b-ok.org etc.). 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the concept 
of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not only to 
Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On Certainty shows 
Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – the problem that 
occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the foundation of 
knowledge.” 
“Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers 
have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must 
ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be based 
on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are really animal 
or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look 
like (empirical) propositions. It is this misleading appearance that leads 
philosophers to believe that at the foundation of thought is yet more thought. Yet 
though they may often look like empirical conclusions, our basic certainties 
constitute the ungrounded, non-propositional underpinning of knowledge, not its 
object. In thus situating the foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties 
that manifest themselves as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place 
where justification comes to an end, and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs 
– and, in passing, shown the logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I 
believe that this is a groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of 
calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.” I reached the same general 
conclusions myself some years ago and stated it in my book reviews. 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type hinge 
certainties in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical propositions', but are 
not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties are not putative metaphysical 
propositions that appear to describe the necessary features of the world, but they 
are putative empirical propositions that appear to describe the contingent features 
of the world. And therein lies some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is 
continuous with all of Wittgenstein's earlier writings – including the Tractatus – 
in that it comes at the end of a long, unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar 
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of our language-games, to demarcate grammar from language in use. Baker and 
Hacker have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the 
grammatical nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what sets 
On Certainty apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' 
propositions and others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not form a 
homogenous mass' (OC 213)): some apparently empirical and contingent 
propositions being in fact nothing but expressions of grammatical rules. The 
importance of this realization is that it leads to the unprecedented insight that 
basic beliefs – though they look like humdrum empirical and contingent 
propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, when conceptually elucidated, 
can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they underlie all thinking (OC 401). 
So that the hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for many years' underpins all 
thought and action, but not as a proposition that strikes us immediately as true; 
rather as a way of acting that underpins what we do (e.g., we research the age of 
the earth) and what we say (e.g., we speak of the earth in the past tense): Giving 
grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not 
certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing 
on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 
204)” 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that has 
plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying 
propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true empirical 
propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-breaking insight that 
our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain propositions striking us as 
true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC was to claim that our basic 
beliefs are true empirical propositions, why bother? He would be merely 
repeating what philosophers before him have been saying for centuries, all the 
while deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather appreciate that 
Wittgenstein has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” (2013). 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy and 
psychology) that (as I have noted many times in recent reviews) in a decade of 
intensive reading I have not seen one person make the obvious connection 
between W’s ‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which 
constitute System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For 
anyone familiar with the two systems framework for understanding behavior that 
has dominated various areas of psychology such as decision theory for the last 
several decades, it should be glaringly obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call them 
B1) are the inherited automated true-only structure of S1 and that their extension 
with experience into true or false sentences (or as I call them B2) are what non-
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philosophers call ‘beliefs’. This may strike some as a mere terminological trifle, but 
I have used the two systems view and its tabulation below as the logical structure 
of rationality for a decade and regard it as the single biggest advance in 
understanding higher order behavior, and hence of W or any philosophical or 
behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to grasp the fundamental importance 
of the automaticity of our behavior due to S1 and the consequent attribution of all 
social interaction (e.g., politics) to the superficialities of S2 is responsible for the 
inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to basic 
biology and psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the world’s 
problems via politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society with 
understanding of the fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested via the 
automaticities of S1 has any chance to save the world. The oblivion to S1 has been 
called by Searle ‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’ and 
by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He 
realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look at how 
language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of language from 
the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of finding one’s way out. 
The entire book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ which separate 
themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ certainty that cannot 
meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a disposition to act (my K2), 
which functions the same as think, hope, judge, understand, imagine, remember, 
believe and many other dispositional words. As I have suggested in my various 
reviews of W and S, these two uses correspond to the modern two systems of 
thought framework that is so powerful in understanding behavior (mind, 
language), and this (and his other work) is the first significant effort to show how 
our fast, prelinguistic automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic 
basis (‘hinges’) for our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional 
psychology. As I have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my 
knowledge, has ever stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away 
with no clear idea of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any 
of his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s 
death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention.  There are few 
references to it in Searle (W’s heir apparent and perhaps the most eminent living 
philosopher) and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are 
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however reasonably good books and articles on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn, 
Coliva and others and parts of many other books and articles, but the best is that 
of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, 
philosophy and life. However (in my view) all analysis of W falls short of fully 
grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing to put behavior in its 
broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt here. 
Some may be disappointed that they don’t get a page by page explanation of OC 
but (as with any other book dealing with behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, history, law, politics, religion, literature etc.) we would 
not get past the first page, as all the issues discussed here arise immediately in any 
discussion of behavior. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now 
known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. 
Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive 
psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost 
universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, 
and even those few who have understood him have not realized the extent of his 
anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but 
his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not 
seem to see this. W analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, 
Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but stop short of 
putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. It 
should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of 
higher order behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate 
easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of “Embodied 
Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work 
(and they do). 
The failure of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to 
the limited attention On Certainty (0C) and his other third period works have 
received until recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and 
others to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy (which I call the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought-DPHOT- or more precisely the 
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study of the language used in DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical structure of 
rationality-LSR), anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature and all of animal behavior alters once we embrace the 
evolutionary framework. 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without 
education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the 
unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s 
‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent 
article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out 
of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously experienced. See 
Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review of it. 
Before remarking on this book, it is essential to grasp the W/S framework so I will 
first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal- Sharrock(DMS) et. al. It 
will help to see my reviews of various books by Searle such as Philosophy in a 
New Century (PNC), and Making the Social World (MSW), the classics by W such 
as TLP, PI, and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear 
description of higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I will 
refer to as the Wittgenstein/Searle (W/S) framework. To say that Searle has carried 
on W’s work is not to imply that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that 
because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only 
ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be 
enunciating some variant or extension of what W said. 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) 
from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To rephrase: all 
study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast System 1 (S1) and 
slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher 
order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, while the later W shows 
how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and in 
each of our personal histories developed into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of psychology 
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is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that philosophers are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. He noted 
that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another notable comment was that if we are not 
concerned with “causes” the activities of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 
(1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum 
that the problem is not to find the solution but to recognize as the solution what 
appears to be only a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 
years ago that we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior 
and that these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125) 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor’s 
LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language of Thought” 
of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds 
of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in action, that 
language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or the mind, and his whole corpus 
can be regarded as the development of this idea.  Many have deconstructed the 
idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view, none better than W in BBB p37 — 
“if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” So, language issues direct from the brain and what could count as 
evidence for an intermediary? 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games (LG’s) 
did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes 
and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these investigations is to 
find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral 
muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind 
but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and 
future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the 
Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, 
intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods 
are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the 
irrelevance of our subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and the 
impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, 
System 1, fast thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions and memories 
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and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized 
that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all 
philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty 
is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we 
just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1—“the greatest danger here 
is wanting to observe oneself”). 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, 
PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to describe and extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all 
they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, multiply our language 
games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later 
Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary psychology 
(EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, 
which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the 
recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of 
Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of evolutionary thought by 
Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF is the prime mechanism of 
evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The Social Conquest of Earth' 
(2012)). 
So, as W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes 
a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without 
threatening our sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly 
different consequences from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by 
DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view 
of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not 
testable propositions (as I would put it). 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that 
is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, 
but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework over 50 
years ago), which is involuntary and automatic and which corresponds to the 
mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and over. One 
might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less 
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“conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain 
activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, 
which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, 
deliberate and propositional (true or false), and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate 
axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally termed 
Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-Reflexive) or 
reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), and the S2 use, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become 
true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). The equation 
of these terms from modern psychology with those used by W and S (and much 
else here) is my idea, so don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my reviews 
on Amazon, vixra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu). 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of involuntary 
fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel 
prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, 
“framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too are language games, so 
there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and 
discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm 
as W made clear, but of course he did not use this terminology), but presumably 
not ever of slow S2 dispositional thinking only, since any thought (intentional 
action) cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of the 
“cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle 
call our EP) which must use S1 to move muscles (action). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by 
all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1, 
composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. As he famously said 
in OC 94 — “but I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of 
its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is 
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the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which typically give rise to the conscious slow thinking of 
S2, which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by feedback into S1, causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in 
targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by Searle `The 
Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone 
familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not 
credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " 
When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." 
And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it 
is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's aphorisms (p132 in 
Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet and 
like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be 
found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that `grammar' 
in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite 
of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing) for which he is often 
incorrectly criticized by Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find (as DMS also notes). 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning—“speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction”-- which 
means to speak or write a well formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false, and this is an act and not a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in 
Philosophy in a New Century p193 — “the basic intentional relation between the 
mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is 
anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since 
those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a 
proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” --
propositions being public events that can be true or false. Hence, the famous 
comment by W from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would not 
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have been able to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that 
the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives 
the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) –“what it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen-
and- the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot 
arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it 
fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. 
Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned 
to talk, then I do know.” 
One of W’s recurring themes is now referred to as Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and 
UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of the work 
of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has 
no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view 
that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and 
higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen 
anything approaching an adequate discussion in philosophy or other behavioral 
science texts, and commonly there is barely a mention. 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social 
Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some perspective. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had 
evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with 
basic utterances that can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) 
describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious automated System One, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location).  We gradually developed the 
further ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe 
memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) 
with the Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true 
or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are 
abilities and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
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Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W  RPP2 
p148).  “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime.  My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are true or 
false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’).  
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s 
and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the 
evolutionarily more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 and System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them 
as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or 
unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no 
tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, 
even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until I 
act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being 
acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) 
and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a 
unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and 
its interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably 
nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few --above all by John 
Searle, who made a simpler version of the table below in his classic book 
Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure 
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of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and 
so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC 
is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the 
same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought 
(HOT), and in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), and thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock.  
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Reflexive—Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible).  Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or intentions and 
actions.  Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all 
actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion - TPI of Searle).  W understood 
this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working 
memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to 
explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world 
direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or 
Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the 
thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
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distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS).  
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations 
of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as 
perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my 
other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and 
COS2 (public representations). To repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions 
of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
 
 
Thus, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his 
‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’.  System 1 is involuntary, reflexive 
or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle).  
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal 
utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic 
in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s 
to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, 
Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an 
heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of 
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studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary 
behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical 
philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my 
other very recent writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may 
consult my articles and books dealing with Wittgenstein, Searle and others on 
academia.edu, philpapers.org, vixra.org, researchgate.net, libgen.io, b-ok.org and 
on Amazon. 
 
His wholly novel ideas and unique super-Socratic trialogues and telegraphic 
writing, coupled with his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, and premature 
death in 1951, resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later thought during 
his lifetime and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 pages been 
published- a project which continues to this day. The only complete edition of the 
largely German nachlass was first issued by Oxford in 2000 with Intelex now 
publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English language books on a searchable 
CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford CD is over $1000 or over $2000 
for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. They can however be 
obtained via interlibrary loan and also, like most books and articles are now freely 
available on the net (libgen.io, b-ok.org and on p2p).  The searchable CDROM of 
his English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, is now on several 
sites on the net and the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca 2021-- 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of course 
most academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and libgen.io. 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
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described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow 
deliberative actions that are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness.  Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 
1. For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true 
or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual 
experience-the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described 
in the same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I 
prefer to call the percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or 
public COS2 of S2. 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in 
intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need 
language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not 
inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have 
public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that 
is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), 
and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of 
laws which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s 
warnings against theories. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive 
Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true-
only mental states with a precise time and location) and over time there evolved 
in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in 
space and time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the 
Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, 
cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 
and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into 
R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with 
all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses.  Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear 
and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible 
public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about 
myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about 
others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s 
and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositional nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf. Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent public representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the 
evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now.  This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major 
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advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events 
and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty 
of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 
‘thoughts’ (my T1) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil 
Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True Only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, 
even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until 
I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston and Budd. Note well that 
Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in 
other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001).  It expands on W’s survey of 
the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) 
(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive 
linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the 
single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in 
the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are 
primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in 
PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self 
Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality 
over which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are 
descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described 
in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all 
the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise 
because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
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Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions 
can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to 
world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, 
or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the 
thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or potential public acts 
(language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) 
of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought 
or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a 
public psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature  
MEMORIES:  Remembering (X was true) 
PREFERENCES, DISPOSITIONS, INCLINATIONS :(X might become True)  
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
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strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: ( I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) : 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank 
Slate or the SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of 
objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed 
by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the 
operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in 
evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and 
actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are 
in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives 
an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects 
of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create 
and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all 
26 
 
except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., 
language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness 
(maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization. Bayesianism is 
highly questionable due to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ 
anything and hence nothing. This occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, 
often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide 
into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on 
Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts 
(muscle movements) producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The 
basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, 
and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 
1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness 
but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., 
our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes 
conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language 
games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
the dispositional verb “thinking“ )—nonrational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2.  It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information 
until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a 
public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do 
thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. 
Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans 
to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross 
contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called 
UA - Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions 
in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--
the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought 
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which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, 
“propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D 
or automated S2A speech and action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science 
to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going 
to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works (as 
opposed to how the brain works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, 
language) is already in full public view (W).  Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in 
neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, 
are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which 
“obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch 
on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the 
mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the 
workings of language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential 
actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of 
resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to 
analyze it. 
Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat 
have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he 
believes.  The present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I 
believe” normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on 
knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive 
of my mental state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my 
review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe 
a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” 
makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can 
be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable 
(i.e., not T or F, not S2).  However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by 
information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can become 
verifiable.   Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from 
subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s 
raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to 
convey information (or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
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Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 
and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning 
of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for 
an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are Searle, 
Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who have posted most 
of their work free online at academia.edu. Baker & Hacker are found in their many 
joint works. The late Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and 
rather nihilistic interpretation that was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon 
Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is free on the net and a must read for 
any student of behavior. 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of 
S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of 
scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- hereafter CDC—my 
acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many others 
pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in the BBB in 
the 30’s when he noted that –“philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and 
countless others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made 
clear) S2 in causal terms is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and 
it is not clear that the highly diverse language games of “causality” can ever be 
made to apply-even their application in physics and chemistry is variable and 
often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or all 
of them that made the apple fall and when did the causes start and end)? But as W 
said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side as usually 
stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not leaving his 
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trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my reviews of W, S 
etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible 
before digging into the literature of causality and the philosophy of science, and 
if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has hit the mark. 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different 
uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature of 
dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as private 
language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which W laid to 
rest ¾ of a century ago. 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they cite. 
Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely 
discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of articles 
largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own journal 
“Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds that of the 
next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next among moderns 
(and the only one with many lectures on YouTube—over 100, which unlike almost 
all other philosophy lectures are a delight to listen to) and Read, etc., are very 
prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks and reviews. But 
CDC and other metaphysicians ignore them and the thousands who regard their 
work as critically important. Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well 
by and large of that of modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the 
confusions it has cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the 
works themselves, perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite 
different. But as W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As 
often noted, his supersocratic trialogues (my term) had a therapeutic intent. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in 
my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple as 
pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we 
all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a 
‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box could contain 
a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private language that only I can 
know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it 
cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruthers’ ISA theory of 
mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have 
explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
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dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of 
Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations” (2004) for a nice explanation of Private Language 
and everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues as few do. 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. The 
very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language games) of 
presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self-contradictory 
cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact on the daily life 
of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person point of view is 
just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a third person one, but absence of 
coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. Likewise, with the 
description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information 
processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
and many others. 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of 
many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and 
hopeless but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like this. There 
is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and then the 
experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with human behavior 
combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious automatisms of S1 
(absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that self, will, and 
consciousness are illusions, since they think they are showing us the ‘real’ meaning 
of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and 
must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of S1. Hence the reason for 
the shift from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my 
review of Carruthers’   ‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken 
or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described as 
having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we must 
regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent), but irrelevant to how 
we use language and how we live, which should be regarded as the point from 
which to begin and end such discussions. 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-not 
Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
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consider here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the 
appearance of a question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or the 
universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious 
machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does, courtesy of the 
death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. We can 
describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ should 
look like. So we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms 
of mind. Even if we should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we 
would still just have a description of what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing 
red, but it is not clear what it would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why 
it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, explanations come to an end 
somewhere. 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruthers’ “Opacity of 
Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds of 
others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of our 
higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given a 
quite different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no reasons 
for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary problems by 
trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike us that these 
views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of their 
adult life promoting them. This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in 
his article ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’—“the hardcore problem becomes 
more and more remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as 
information and perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be 
being faced if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human 
beings, embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, 
etc…then it can become perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only when 
one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human domains 
(supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of as mechanical} 
or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), does it 
begin to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, 
reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push further and further 
from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which 
ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been 
given for us to think that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded 
as real. There is no good reason to think that there should be a science of 
consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more than there need be a science of 
numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of games or of constellations or of 
32 
 
objects whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of 
ourselves as embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as 
brains with minds ‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that 
science can help us bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what 
consciousness really is and when it is really present. For it cannot help us when 
there is a conflict of criteria, when our machines come into conflict with ourselves, 
into conflict with us. For our machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first 
place. There can be no such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t 
because… the hard problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a 
problem has even been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the 
keeping alive indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological 
satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the 
understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, that in 
stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein made 
clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn in language 
and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the ‘limits 
of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and that we 
should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in the fact that 
we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except by repeating 
the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 1931). I also find it 
useful to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition is nothing but belief in the 
causal nexus” -- written a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical problems). 
"How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. 
We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime 
perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. But that is just what commits 
us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of 
what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent.) -- And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts 
falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don't want to deny them. Another seemingly trivial comment by W 
(PI p271) asked us to imagine a person who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant 
but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 
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6.52) that when all scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to 
question, and that is itself the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic 
(i.e., due to scientism not science) failures of CDC et al is his observation that it is 
a very common mistake to think that something must make us do what we do, 
which leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake which 
we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the 
word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight which 
makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must 
make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause 
and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons 
has an end.” BBB p143 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no 
reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ 
oneself by working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being 
told the answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and 
‘working on oneself’. 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is 
often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the most prominent 
philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also the fact 
(seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, reduction 
does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be extended (and has 
often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ 
or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make neurophysiology privileged? The 
ancient Greeks generated the idea that nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz 
famously described the universe as a giant machine. Most recently Stephan 
Wolfram became a legend in the history of pseudoscience for his description of 
the universe as a computer automaton in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, 
mechanism, idealism, reductionism, behaviorism and dualism in their many 
guises are hardly news and, to a Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W 
dictated the Blue and Brown books in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent 
publication and extensive commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is 
a hopeless task. W realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard 
working through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy it 
is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James 
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Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a 
great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘cause’, ‘event’, ‘happen’, 
‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in science or 
philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in at random 
with many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without sense. Much of 
academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high comedy (as opposed 
to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., “comedy dealing 
with polite society, characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate 
plot”-(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time-done rightly, it is the 
best way to spend time. How else can we understand dispel the chaos in the 
behavioral sciences or describe our mental life and the higher order thought of 
System 2--the most intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s examples 
describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of System 2 to build 
on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and as societies acquire a 
world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on the bedrock of our 
axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive perception and action to the amazing 
edifice of science and culture. The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity 
passed long ago from something that could be challenged to certainties that can 
only be modified, and at the other end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of 
finding out that there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical 
view is incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though written 
when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant as 
his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy (the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the light, after three 
thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away from philosophy 
and from physics. 
 “The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got 
it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the 
realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already 
there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” 
(said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
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p183 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is 
at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
